Kennesaw State University

DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University
Master of Arts in American Studies Capstones

Interdisciplinary Studies Department

Spring 5-7-2018

Sequels and SAMs: Re-contextualized Media and
Affective Memory
Ben Rogers

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/mast_etd
Part of the American Studies Commons
Recommended Citation
Rogers, Ben, "Sequels and SAMs: Re-contextualized Media and Affective Memory" (2018). Master of Arts in American Studies
Capstones. 20.
https://digitalcommons.kennesaw.edu/mast_etd/20

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Interdisciplinary Studies Department at DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State University. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Master of Arts in American Studies Capstones by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Kennesaw State
University. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@kennesaw.edu.

1

SEQUELS OR SAMS: RE-CONTEXTUALIZED MEDIA, AFFECTIVE MEMORY, AND

BLADE RUNNER 2049

A Thesis

Presented to

The Academic Faculty

By

Ben Rogers

In Partial Fulfillment

Of the Requirements for the Degree of

Masters of Arts in American Studies

Kennesaw State University

May 2018

2

Contents
Literature Review………………………………………………………………………………..3
-Embodiment and Space
-Creating Memories with Media
-Public Memory and the Politics of Media
-New Media Possibilities for Constructing Memories
-Next Steps
Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………..23
-Temporality
-Singular Memory
-Participation
-Real-World Application
Part I: The Threat of Hollywood Sequels……………………………………………………..36
-Staple Associative Memory
-Threatening SAM
-The Evolution of Blade Runner
-Exploring “What” and “How” to Remember
-Engaging SAM
Part II: Alternative Media Platforms…………………………………………………………60
- Netflix
-The Personal Video
-Augmented Reality in the Blade Runner “Future”
-Conclusion
Bibliography………………………………………………………………………………….…70

3

Literature Review
Post-structuralism is an idea that rethinks the relationship between creation and critique.
Articulated well by Gregory Ulmer, the creator and critic of art are not on opposite sides of a
piece of art; instead, both artist and critic create and construct art in their own way—Roland
Barthes refers to both as writers.1 This is based on the principle that there is no true reflection of
the world because any viewer of the either the creation or the critique will bring his own
subjective background and context to the situation. Not even language can be understood as a
common truth.
Because we experience subjectively, Ulmer suggests that the best way to create or
critique is by gathering multiple pieces connected to an idea, placing them together in a montage,
and, in turn, allowing for the creation of something new.2 Instead of a mirroring effect where
one signifier leads to one specific signified, e.g. the color red signifying only love, a signifier can
be repeated over and over in new contexts with other groupings, which allows for no true
conclusions.3 But not all producers create post-structural representations, and the discussion of
who creates and reproduces art, and in what way, has risen together with the mass reproduction
of art in the 20th and 21st centuries. Whoever controls the creation of art establishes knowledge,
and in turn power, that influences how people feel about the world in the present as well as shape
their understandings of the past.
In the 1930’s, Walter Benjamin theorized that the reproduction of art was changing the
way we interact with it. He referred to it as mechanical reproduction. Until that time, art carved
in stone or on buildings was always attached to the concrete space. Because of this, art was used

Gregory L. Ulmer, “The Object of Post-Criticism,” In The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture, ed. Hal
Foster (New York: The New Press, 1983), 83-84.
2
Ibid., 86.
3
Ibid., 89.
1
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for rituals and had a certain wonder about it.4 But as technology allowed for mass reproduction
of art, it increasingly became a place of contestation for ideologies. On the one hand, mass
production of art worked as a masking tool for totalitarian ideals and beliefs.5 On the other, mass
production gave more people the opportunity to create art and therefore join the discourse. The
control over who gets to create and produce art affects not only the present but also what we
remember as individuals and as a culture at large.
Using multiple frameworks to describe our public memory of history, Mathew Hoadek
and Kendall Phillips tell us that the past we know often depends on power relations in the
present.6 They note that starting in the 1980’s, writing about how and what we remember
increased. The increase in forms of media has added another layer to the development of private
and public memory and how they relate to one another. Specifically, mobile media has made
scholars focus on the relationship between time and space. This literature review explains the
ways that people interact with media to establish memories and how new creations of media
have changed the way we think about our lives in relation to space and time.
Even before mobile media, American Studies scholars were exploring the relationships
that exist within certain spaces. They often ask who has voice and in turn agency. If certain
groups do not have the chance to speak about their experiences or struggles, their lives are
devalued by the larger culture; therefore space becomes a place where “discursive and political
work can be done when people recognize that space is the place to do it.”7 As media becomes

Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Mechanical Reproducibility,” ed. by Hannah Arendt, trans.
by Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), 24.
5
Jentery Sayers, “Technology,” In Keywords for American Cultural Studies, ed. Bruce Burgett and Glenn Hendler,
(New York: New York University Press, 2014)
6
Mathew Houdek and Kendall R. Phillips. “Public Memory.” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Communication,
(2017), doi: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190228613.013.181
7
George Lipsitz, “Space,” in Keywords for American Cultural Studies, ed. Bruce Burgett and Glenn Hendler, (New
York: New York University Press, 2014), 231.
4
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globalized, media scholars have paid particular attention to how we make spaces into places and
how certain voices help shape and form identity within the places that we inhabit.
As more people use mobile media in the spaces of our everyday lives, Jason Farman has
established his theories about “self-embodiment” in media. The idea is that the distinction
between the virtual and material world are becoming less clear as we move closer to
technologies being invisible.8 Less clear does not mean less productive. It means our
interactions in the actual world and the virtual world affect each other. From there, both spaces
of embodiment can be remembered both individually and collectively as public memory; public
memory can be understood as moving beyond individual memory and encompassing the social
heading of a collective and/or official history.9 Throughout history, new media has made people
nervous about the future of social interaction; they ask, how will new technologies change the
way we interact and come to know ourselves? Increasingly, media scholars have subdued their
anxieties about new technologies and started focusing on how technology can work as a
productive space for connecting people and things and creating new ways of forming memories.
Embodiment and Space
In this section, I start by establishing how we can learn to understand our bodies as living
in affectual space. I then move to discussing how this understanding of our bodies can be created
in virtual spaces. Media scholars take seriously the simplest affectual and physical experiences,
as well as the largest cultural, philosophical, and historical presence of ideas. For obvious
reasons, mobile media technologies have opened discussions over space. The Actor-NetworkTheory (ANT) articulated by Bruno Latour is a nice framework for understanding how we
interact within space. Latour seeks to change the understanding of the social from something that

8
9

Jason Farman, Mobile Interface Theory: Embodied Space and Locative Media, (New York: Routledge, 2012), 7.
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happens just between people to something that happens between people, objects, and ideas. He
notes five different ways to classify and interpret “social”: methodology, actions, groups, facts,
and objects themselves. ANT takes into consideration how “things” affect us, which works
nicely for talking about new technologies. Only by understanding the connection between all five
pieces in any one moment will an understanding of the whole develop. As a framework of study,
Latour cautions against moving too quickly to get conclusions. He implores scholars to look at
what exists, and then connect the actions, groups, facts, and objects without trying to fit them
into pre-established frameworks.10 Kathleen Stewart describes this type of affect-based study as
one that understands that objects are never fixed but “move in and out of existence.”11 This type
of ethnographic interpretation asks that we see the world from where we stand—not from above
looking down but in the middle of the complexities of everyday life.
Latour’s five pieces connect to create certain spaces and can be done with or without
mobile devices. Seemingly in response to the explosion of mobile media and the scholarship that
has followed, Phil Bratta describes what he calls a “Lived Event,” which can come in the form of
public performance art, topological space, and collective action. Bratta explains that a Lived
Event represents an affective and proprioceptive type of experience devoid of mobile media.12 In
all three situations, the rhetoric of these events can literally be the bodies that move within and
create the space. The performance can then be understood without having to be explained with a
conclusion, another concept of post-structuralism.13 Feminist scholars have often used this notion
to extend the discussion of moving bodies as rhetorical. According to Maureen Johnson, Daisy
Levy, Katie Manthey, and Maria Novotny, people counter dominant norms of heteronormative
10

Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: an Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory, (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2005), 23.
11
Kathleen Stewart, "In the World that Affect Proposed," Cultural Anthropology 32, no. 2 (2017): 198.
12
Phil Bratta, “Rhetoric and Event: The Embodiment of Lived Events,” Enculturation (August 12, 2015).
13
Ulmer, 94.
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and patriarchal whiteness, in the spaces they exist, by cultivating “an even more expansive view
of embodied rhetorics, one that supports our discipline’s movement beyond seeing the body in
binary terms as either objectified or subjectified.”14 To establish spaces that reflect both goals,
both the performer and the audience must be involved in the process, which in theory makes the
event unpredictable and able to create new spaces for progress.
Bratta establishes his theory of the Lived Event based on his anxiety about the mobile
GPS. The GPS system works within the Cartesian map model, in which each person already has
a mental conception of the whole from start to finish.15 For example, if I follow the GPS to the
store, I cut off possibilities for new or better routes and may even stop considering that there may
be other alternative routes. Whereas Bratta sees the mobile device as particularly Cartesian and
therefore unable to create change, other scholars have discussed how new technologies allow for
people to interact and dialogue in new ways. For example, Jessica Slentz talks about the
Cleveland Museum of Art’s use of touch screen technologies that allows people to interact with
the art. They are used to “foster rhetorical experiences that shift the interpretive position of the
visitor, allowing the visitor to actively and publicly participate in types of activities that in the
past were exclusively undertaken privately by the institution.”16 Although the original art may be
displayed by the institution, people can use technologies to alter and change the meaning. It also
shows that large institutions are not the only one’s creating and producing art.
Following in the footsteps of Benjamin, Henry Jenkins refers to the reinterpreting and
reproducing of media as convergence culture. Convergence culture happens when grassroots
consumers take a piece of art created by the large institutions, rearticulate it, reproduce it, and in
Maureen Johnson , Daisy Levy, Katie Manthey, and Maria Novotny, “Embodiment: Embodying Feminist
Rhetorics,” Peitho18.1, (2015), 39.
15
Bratta.
16
Jessica Slentz, “Habits of Interaction: Touchscreen Technology and the Rhetorical Experience of Co-Curation at
the Cleveland Museum of Art,” Enculturation (July 20, 2016).
14
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turn, give it new meaning. People utilize the old and make it something new. This can happen
multiple times across multiple platforms as ideas and aesthetics are borrowed and manipulated
by the grassroots populations.17 Jenkins’ articulation of convergence culture matters because it
works locally by and through anyone participating. When anyone has the potential to be involved
in the discourse, new ways of thinking are created. For Jenkins, it ultimately changes the way
media is produced and therefore has possibilities for changing large institutional ideologies that
are established through mass production. When people go to the movie theater, they are making
a decision to be entertained, but mobile media has allowed for the creation and reproduction of
art within the fabrics of our everyday lives. This does not mean that all forms of mobile media
are just for entertainment.
Throughout Farman’s Mobile Interface Theory, he persuades readers to consider how
people have come to create a sense of self through the use of mobile media.18 Farman argues that
habitual practices on mobile devices create true embodiment for a user in the same way that
Lived Events can. He borrows from Ben Schniederman to describe how media technology works
within a certain predictable framework, and if enough positive outcomes exist within a mobile
interface, the “haptic reciprocity engages the user in a feedback loop that produces sensoryinscribed embodiment.” 19 Both Bratta and Farman believe that habit can create new spaces for
sensory-embodiment, but Farman sees beyond the Cartesian model of the mobile device and
seeks to embrace the possibility for new ways of forming identity. Forming identity with the use
of media is crucial to the understanding of memory discussed later in this review.

17

Henry Jenkins, Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media Collide. (New York: New York University
Press, 2008), 3.
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Farman, 12.
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Ibid., 65.
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Cultural studies scholar Ben Highmore adds to the possibilities created by habit in his
work Ordinary Lives: Studies in the Everyday. As many people would probably admit,
distraction can be a negative word in that it implies that we cannot stay focused. Some even
blame this distraction on the constant barrage of media. But, distraction can also be considered
an attention to something new and more productive.20 When we have a habit, we know what to
expect and can do it without thinking. When we can do something without thinking, we have the
opportunity to think about something else. Highmore suggest that the media saturation has
trained people to establish habit for some things while learning to make distraction productive.
For example, we can be scrolling through the internet and understand the plot of the TV show
playing nearby.21 Basically, we are better at navigating the world.
Moving through media spaces connects well to affective movements of daily life because
“the practice of embodied space offers an experience of spatiality as an immersive world that is
created as more than what is immediately available to the senses.”22 Stewart explains that there
are multiple singularities beyond the senses that connect to create our experience. When we
understand media as a part of these connections, we are forced to look more precisely at the way
we explain our sense of being in the world, including the way we interact with and remember our
past.23 From this point, I want to transition into how new types of media affect the way we
remember.
Creating Memories with Media
In the past century, the role of the senses in making memories has changed drastically.
Literature can be understood as linear because we read books from start to finish within a
Ben Highmore, “Absented Minded Media,” in Ordinary Lives: Studies in the Everyday (New York: Routledge,
2011), 127.
21
Ibid., 134.
22
Farman, 78.
23
Stewart, 192.
20
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chronological narrative. But, electronic technologies allow for a shift from linear time.
Psychologist Hugo Munsterberg wrote that the invention of the film, or the Photoplay, created
new ways of having to remember.24 Munsterberg compares the theater to the film—which at the
time of his writing in 1916 was relatively new. In theater, the first act must be remembered
during act two, but with the photoplay, “the reality has lost its own continuous connection and
become shaped by the demands of our soul.”25 With the introduction of flashbacks and close-ups,
the act of remembering a scene in its entirety, based on recollection, no longer becomes
necessary. The parts that need to be remembered are objectified on screen. Within this context,
the temporal element of life blurs.
A hundred years later, Vivian Sobchack builds her essay on a similar premise to
Munsterberg’s chapter on memory but structures her essay starting with photography, then
cinema, and a step further to electronic media. In discussing the static state of a photograph, she
explains how an image is objectified and possessed by “inviting contemplation of the scene,” as
something that existed in the past.26 These photographs become memories that we possess not
just in a material sense but as validation of our past. Sobchack uses the 1982 film Blade Runner
as an example. In the film, as the distinction between real and artificial humans comes into
question, photographs are considered markers of an authentic past. Photographs give us a way of
self-possessing, or attaching a sense of truth to our past. They form pieces of our identity and
who we imagine ourselves to be.

24

Hugo Munsterberg, The Photoplay: A Psychological Study, (D. Appletone and Company, 1916), 93.
Munsterburg, 95.
26
Vivian Sobchack, “The Scene of the Screen: Envisioning Photographic, Cinematic, and Electronic ‘Presence’,”
in Carnal Thoughts: Embodiment and Moving Image Culture (University of California Press, 2004),6.
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The advent of the cinema in the next step of our historical progression, “invited the
spectator into the scene.”27 With cinema, we are made aware of our own act of viewing and what
it looks like to see the world. Because a film constantly moves forward and with a degree of
anticipation, it creates a moment simultaneously of a subjective temporality as we go through the
plot of the movie but within an objective real time. We know we have our own narrative outside
of the subjective time of the movie but we are engrossed in the narrative of the movie’s plot.
When we watch films, they “construct a subjective temporality other than—yet simultaneous
with—the irreversible direction and forward momentum of objective time.”28
However, Sobchack argues that the distinction between objective and subjective has
blurred since the arrival of electronic technologies. Electronic technologies like the VCR allow
for the stopping and rewinding of moving images, but we always watch them in our own
subjective chronological order, even if we rewind a certain part and watch it twice. When we
watch a movie, there is a linear structure in its narrative, but we experience it in our own
intentional and subjective lived body experience as we look forward to what we will see next.
Whereas the photograph focuses on our identity in the past, the cinema is based on an excitement
for the future.
Further development of electronic technologies has allowed for people to create and alter
their own forms of cinema. The saturation of technological data, according to Sobchack, creates
simulations of what would otherwise be concrete ideas. The reproduction of images and cinema
as data makes the images lose their “moral and physical gravity.”29 With unlimited stimulation,
people desire immediate gratification in an absolute presence. Compared to the subjective
experience we have when we watch a movie, electronic media does not offer either “a point of
27

Sobchack, 12.
Ibid., 13
29
Sobchack, 15.
28
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view or visual situation.”30 Sobchack argues that we no longer see time as past/present/future but
“is now constituted and lived paradoxically as a homogeneous experience of discontinuity.”31
However, in her endnotes, she acknowledges that more scholars are working toward
understanding how people can virtually embody more productively.32 Farman’s work mentioned
above would fall into this category. As with anything that at first seems overwhelming, people
have adapted to navigate the over saturation of media and found ways to not be overwhelmed.
As we experience the world through photographs, videos, and/or mobile media, all of the
images intermix with our own experiences and become part of the same past. Victor Burgin uses
the phrase “sequence-image” to refer to the way recollections of past images will transpose
themselves onto the everyday scenery in our minds.33 These images are based on affectual and
perceptual moments in our past, but are not in a linear story. For example, Burgin describes how
we no longer experience the cinema in just one context. We see trailers of it, parts of it in other
situations like advertisements, or on a billboard. These fragments become part of our memory
but often in an indescribable way.34 For Burgin, once the memories are described, they become
part of a narrative and become objectified, but this has not stopped people from trying to find
other ways of describing our past.
One way of recalling the moments of our memories is through a form of cognitive
mapping. Didem Ozkul and David Gauntlett created a sketch mapping exercise to get an
understanding of how people connect certain moments to certain places. They take the idea of a
cognitive map, which is really a “fluctuating set of stored knowledge and emotions,” and turn it
into an art-making exercise where they ask people to sketch their associations with certain
30

Ibid., 18.
Ibid., 17.
32
Ibid., 21.
33
Victor Burgin, “Possessive, Pensive and Possessed,” Mixed Media, Mixed Memory, (2006), 199.
34
Ibid., 200.
31
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places.35 Although related more to place than actual memories, they do argue that getting a sense
of place can then create a recollection of what happened and with whom, ultimately creating a
story of the self and potentially a better understanding of identity.36 They conclude that by
presenting our lives on media platforms, we often create a highlight reel of our lives, which may
in turn create a more positive sense of self.37
Importantly, our memories are always infused with the broader cultural representations
beyond what we see with our own eyes. Burgin identifies this relation to a cultural memory as a
“third memory” that “allows the transmission of experience across generations.”38 This memory
does not come from individual experience but from the cultural history established through
audio-visual platforms. These memories are often attained through consuming them on a mass
scale. Burgin borrows from Bernard Stiegler who wonders whether we can ever really have our
own singular identity when many of us watch the same television and cinematic programs.39
Burgin notes that, to use Jenkins term above, convergence culture allows the potential for adding
consumer and grassroots voices to the discourse on multiple platforms. People can condemn and
resist institutional ideologies. Still, Burgin is skeptical of our ability to create individual
testament. Again referring to Stiegler, Burgin questions whether the framework of “culture as
spectacle” is so instilled in people’s minds that it is the only framework they can work within.
As other scholars have noted, mobile media makes the distinction between the dominant
and the grassroots creators blurry. Compared to the act of going to the theater and paying for a
movie, people now have access to what used to be separate platforms all on one device. When

Didem Ozkul and David Gauntlett, “Locative Media in the City: Drawing Maps and Telling Stories.” In The
Mobile Story, ed. by Jason Farman, (New York: Routledge, 2014), 116.
36
Ibid., 120.
37
Ibid., 125.
38
Burgin, 203.
39
Ibid., 204.
35
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people do not know who is creating the representations, it becomes harder to decipher between
the dominant and grassroots creations. This goes a step further when trying to represent history.
As Ekaterina Haskins uncovers, dominant historic representations are looking more like
grassroots representations because they want to connect with the popular imaginations.40 With
electronic media, fewer demarcations exist between private and public memory. The next section
discusses the relationship between dominant and grassroots creators of media and how the
connection between the two affects public memory.
Public Memory and the Politics of Media
Media’s relevance in everyday life makes physical media devices and the artifacts stored
within them part of cultural memory. Before I dive into a more detailed breakdown of theories
and example, I want to establish a few concepts from a few different authors. Jason Kalin
acknowledges that “recent scholarship has begun to argue more explicitly that new media
technologies oblige scholars to rethink memory by ‘changing what we consider to be the past’
along with the acts of remembering and forgetting.”41 I noted above that Sobchack sees the
increase in data as a devaluation of the body and a loss of the linear past/present/future. I also
said she gives credence to scholars studying embodiment of these data-filled spaces. As noted,
Farman falls into this category. For Farman, the oversaturation of the database exists only in
theory.42 In order for the database to exist, it must have direct activity with it. Therefore, when
people interact with the database, it becomes a part of a lived narrative.43 To put it in further
context, the lived narrative of a virtual space can be paralleled to the Lived Event established by
Bratta. Therefore, in the same way that a Lived Event creates new conceptions of space so, too,
40

Hoadek and Phillips.
Jason Kalin, “Gathering Memories form Augmented Reality,” In Augmented Reality: Innovative Perspectives
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Farman, 126.
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can interactions across a database. Because mobile arenas are lived subjectively as people use the
technologies, they can become spaces of community, conflict, and change within the structure of
multiple stories existing through them.
In his discussion of augmented reality, Kalin uses ideas from the authors Joanne GardeHansen, Andrew Hoskins, and Anne Reading, who pursue "a concept of digital memory as one
that rethinks time as linear and moves toward a concept of time and memory as spatial and
involving organic participation with inorganic structures,” creating a new memory ecology from
time to space.44 For these scholars, remembering is not based simply on what is remembered,
but how it is being remembered and within what platforms.
Some scholars believe that media must work within the constructs of skills already
established or otherwise leave the viewer disoriented. In discussing the benefits of the Cleveland
Art Museum’s interactive features, Slentz says that the digital knowledge brought to the exhibit
by viewers allows them to become involved in a way that would otherwise take certain levels of
expertise. For instance, people use their fingers to swipe, drag, and draw on the art pieces which
can “determine what they can do with its interface and the content it displays,” and allows for
“new ways of interpreting and meaning-making.”45 Throughout most of museum history,
interaction with the art was impossible. Curators organized and exhibited art pieces in certain
defined orders, and all the viewer was able to do was observe. As Farman indicates, the key here
is the reciprocity of spaces.46 One way to determine the future politics of a space is to ask
whether there is reciprocity between creator and viewer. Without it, we are subject to the
established frameworks of classical viewing experiences as well as ideologies.

44
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Although the example discusses the potential for politics of media, I am not interested in
museums as compared with other forms of media like mobile media and cinema. This is because
people do not always critique the spaces they interact in on a daily basis. By analyzing social
media, Farman found that people “seek reciprocal relationships with people who tend to reiterate
their worldview.” 47 Scholars have focused on the potential of mobile media devices for
establishing societal and political conflicts. Particularly helpful in this area is Tarleton Gillespie
who argues that “technology can create distinct political valences, picking and choosing among
human practices according to a veiled agenda” or of the particular designer of the product. 48 He
borrows from Steve Woolger who claims that like traditional texts, the meaning of a tool is a
product of its interpretation in a particular context.49 The goal must be to figure out the potential
possibilities for use, and what is inherently “left off the list.”50
This begs the question of who is the author of our memories and how much control do we
have in forming and displaying them. One way to look at memory construction is to focus on
metaphors and the possibilities they promote or diminish. Gillespie discusses the way that
metaphors are used for remembering. Metaphors make concepts easier to learn because they
make confusing concepts usable.51 Using Latour’s Actor-Network-Theory, Gillespie sets up the
idea that people interact with things, or tools, to produce certain ways of thinking. Therefore, our
thinking is in certain ways established by these tools. Metaphors can establish certain restrictions
because they encourage others. Even when there is collaboration between author and viewer, the

47

Ibid., 72.
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actual tools still only allow certain pre-established ways of interacting and thinking.52 I want to
acknowledge a few examples to show how this can happen.
In traditional artistic or literary fields, the commissions for art have historically come
from the elite. In public places, this means that the community has no chance to dialogue about
what they want displayed. Victoria Gallaher and Margaret LaWare discuss, for instance, the arm
of Joe Louis in Detroit titled “The Fist” and the way it relates to cultural memory. 53 According to
Gallaher and LaWare, the problem with the statue is who actually commissioned the work; rarely
are the community members involved in the process of making decisions about what art will be
commissioned. Because the art is in a public place, whatever is commissioned will inevitably
become part of their cultural memory. If I were to see the statue, I would have some type of
reaction. If my reaction fit into a certain already established framework, it may be hard to look at
it in another way later on in my life.
Michael Frisch, a historian and professor at New York State did a study on the cultural
memory of his students to show how engrained these preconceived notions can be. He argues
that the American people’s memories have been pigeonholed into an “ongoing fixation on
creation and myths of origin.”54 For instance, when he analyzed his class over a few decades, the
two most popular figures remembered in American history were George Washington and Betsy
Ross. According to Frisch, while Washington often holds the title of Father of our country, Ross
works as the religious reference of the Virgin Mary. Whereas Mary was the vessel for Jesus,
Ross was the vessel for the American flag, i.e. the most sacred symbol. This is just one example

52

Ibid., 118.
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of how long-held cultural memories are difficult to imagine in other ways. When kids go to
school, play with their friends, and grow-up, they begin to establish certain long and short-term
identities. The conflict over who gets to have a say in establishing those identities changes the
way we think about and interact with media.
New Media Possibilities for Constructing Memories
Understanding the power of cultural artifacts and public history formation has led to the
creation of media devices and theories that allow for new ways of forming memories. This
includes site-specific mobile applications and also augmented reality or ubiquitous computing,
all of which allow for re-contextualizing memories. They also allow reciprocity between
dominant and grassroots individuals within particular spaces. Farman employs the idea that in
media practices that connect orality, archive, community, and individual, the passive role of
learning and remembering does not apply but instead allows for more types of engagement.55
Kalin, who I use to discuss augmented reality, explains how all collective memory is already
augmented because it relies on materials for support.56 Therefore, if we change the material,
then we change the memory.
For some scholars, ever-present media makes moments potentially unmemorable.57 For
others like Kalin, ubiquitous computing creates ways of making life more memorable. He
describes the act of walking around the city with the help of augmented reality apps. As we
experience this realm of augmented reality, we have the ability to share moments both in real
time and asynchronously. Through these various apps, Kalin shows us how other people’s past
moments, as well as our own, are layered together on top of one another. As we move through

55
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certain spaces, the memories or histories attached to those spaces through the digital technology
allows for new ways of connecting with people and ideas.58
The human networks that exist in memory are not enough to reflect how we actually
gather memories, which are not always just between people. Along the same lines as the ActorNetwork-Theory, Kalin use Thomas Rickert’s idea of ambience to describe all the interlocking
surroundings and the way that technology can be a part of these memories in our daily lives.59
Ambience considers all affectual singularities. Stewart says that a “world charged with affect is a
prolific, mixed-use contact zone in an ongoing state of transition that leaves people improvising
with already-felts.60 Already-felts refers to the memories and feelings that we always carry with
us to interpret the world. With the help of augmented reality, Kalin calls this experience “digital
ambient memory,” which describes an experience infused with music or visual surroundings that
reflect a more comprehensive world experience. In this subject-object scenario, the subject soaks
in the surroundings, including the functions of augmented reality, that then become the way we
experience. Kalin says that, “digital ambient memory connotes a holding together in time, a
gesture toward how to live life inside time.” 61
When we experience ambience, we make life more memorable. Referring to Google
Glass, Kalin explains that, “Though many of these activities [of daily life] are ostensibly
ordinary and mundane, the Glass videos portray them as worthy of memory, and thus the
impetus for connecting with others.”62 He argues that instead of focusing on the media tools, we
will connect the virtual with the components of material, everyday life—creating more
worthwhile moments to remember.
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I want to include a necessary side note in this otherwise forward-thinking section. The
creation of a world of mobility and embodiment does not always include real movement. In The
Mobile Story, Marc Ruppel asks an important question: “if we don’t actually go anywhere when
we use these devices, then what’s the point?”63 Where Kalin describes a virtual world that
infuses with the existence of the real world, Ruppel highlights the possibility for mobile media to
create an entirely fictional world for the user. As compared to interactive space, the fictional
world relies solely on the original authors for content. In these cases, media perpetuates itself by
having fiction stories that rely on other forms of media within their plots. In terms of ambience,
technology becomes part of the ambience of other technologies, therefore furthering the
capitalistic breadth and desire for more technology.
Technologies matter because they have historically helped mold certain economic
structures. Sobchack contextualizes the relevance of her work by quoting Fredric Jameson, who
“correlates the major technological changes that revolutionized the structure of capital—
changing market capitalism to monopoly capitalism to multinational capitalism.”64 If we
understand how technologies infuse dominant ideals of hegemony into everyday life, we
counteract the reality of it by introducing cognitive dissonance. Paula Levine’s essay looks at
how new lessons can be learned from connecting through media across different spaces. She uses
an experiment by Charlan Nemeth to talk about the science of neuroplasticity.65 Nemeth asked
two groups of people to associate simple relations out loud, for instance the sky with a color, but
he had one person provide a dissenting voice. This person may say the sky was red. In the groups
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with the dissenter, he found that people had more creative responses: essentially proving that
people must be provoked in order to understand new ways of thinking. According to her
research, the more experiences one has the more their brain develops, so “locative and mobile
media . . . allows new possibilities for reconfiguring experience in the physical, public space that
can become an opportunity to reshape experiences in which viewers see things differently on the
ground.”66 She explains that everyone must interact in the shaping of their cognitive mapping in
order to build upon “empathetic narratives” as a means for understanding the world. Through
sketch maps, as described about by Ozkul and Gauntlett, we retell our stories in order to shape
our identity and self-representation; this in turn asks us to consider our “symbolic output in
relation to other people’s and tends toward a positive and ‘identity-affirming’ role.”67
Another example of the way to create these empathies can be seen through Ulmer’s
creation of what he calls the Konsult. The Konsult is a way of getting people to collaborate
together by using technology. The goal is to create a poststructural montage. He envisions it
being used during times of trauma. In these times of a trauma, the group of people who have
been affected share details about family, history, mythology, and philosophy that are all put into
an archive. When all the pieces are put together, they create a montage that provides an
“experience of identification with the testimonials collected in the archive.”68 Ulmer posits that
in times of trauma, sharing commodities or goods is not enough to make people happy. Because
goods can always be manipulated as something to be sold, they can always be turned into
exchange value.69 Within the archive of the Konsult, the individual meanings of narratives are
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repurposed for the goal of the Konsult as a whole. For the people who experience the collection
of stories, they can understand their community’s needs and connections better.
Next Steps
On the one hand, I believe media scholars are particularly interested in the possibilities
for media and may forget to acknowledge the realities at hand. On the other hand, our future
realities only change for the better if we imagine them first. The way we think towards the future
makes how we feel about our past all the more relevant. This is why it is necessary to continue to
evaluate the way we feel about and interact with our memories. But just because memories affect
the future does not mean people always want to remember the past. If we use Lanham’s outline
of the rhetorical ideal of life, we get one perspective of the goal of the Western person.
Established by Aristotle, the goal is based on the rhetorical man who thinks about pursuing,
progressing, and most of all seeking pleasure.70 This type of thinking focuses on the present
alone. At other times in this man’s life, he “flatters himself” with imaging himself in the larger
context of the world and becomes serious.71 Then, he returns to seeking immediate pleasure.
According to Lanham, this is a necessary oscillation back and forth. But, Farman refers to
Benjamin to describe how “progress obscures” our view of the past.72 Benjamin uses a metaphor
of an angel being blown into the future looking back on the wreckage of the past. Through this
metaphor, we understand that the past never exists as linear or even whole and complete.
Benjamin refers to the storm that creates the wreckage as our version of “progress.”73 Although
we desire pleasure and progress, we often forget our past, but we can also be reminded of it in
certain contexts.
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Introduction
“Consciousness is never constituted purely, simply and originally, in itself; it is always both a little
bit monkey and a little bit parrot”74– Bernard Stiegler

Temporality
The American people have adopted specific time units in their daily lives in large part
because of the rise of a capitalistic society. According to Karl Marx, Walter Benjamin, and many
others, capitalism must make the time (on our watches) equal to production value.75 Workers in a
capitalist society adhere to units of time for work, time for pleasure, or time with the family.
These are broken up into minutes and seconds that can be quantified and made into profit. Mary
Ann Doane explains that time is, “in a sense, externalized, a surface phenomenon, which the
modern subject must ceaselessly attempt to repossess through its multifarious representations.”76
People navigate these timeframes daily, yet when we think about it, we are aware that different
hours do not feel the same length.
Nothing changes our relationship to these timeframes more than the creation of the
temporal motion picture. On one level, this essay stems from a history of writers who have
sought to understand the relationship between people and the various forms of audiovisual
technologies. In the first section of this introduction, I discuss temporality through the work of
Bernard Stiegler in his two volumes of Symbolic Misery. The word temporal, in this sense, refers
to any object “constituted by the flow of its passing . . . a film [in the theater] only appears to the
extent that it disappears.”77 Like a film, consciousness is also temporal (Stiegler also uses the
phrase in flux). All interactions with the audiovisual involve some form of an adoption of
74

Bernard Stiegler, Symbolic Misery Vol. 1: The Hyperindustrial Epoch, trans. Barnaby Norman (Editions Galilee,
2004), 28.
75
Mary Ann Doane, The Emergence of Cinematic Time: Modernity, Contingency, the Archive, (Harvard University
Press, 2002), 7.
76
Doane, 9.
77
Stiegler, Vol. 1, 17.

24

temporality. Television and cinema are temporal, whereas a hardcover book is not. A reader may
get “swept away” by the narrative of a book, but the act of reading does not parallel a particular
temporality.78 The book itself is not a temporal aesthetic because there is no listening component
to envelope the consciousness.
Different forms of media have different degrees of adoptive temporality. Some films are
seen on a mobile phone lying in bed, and songs are blared through headphones as people walk
the streets. On the television at home, the parallel of temporal consciousness and the temporal
show or film can be interrupted by pressing pause or getting a snack. These types of viewing
spaces add a social component. The effect of the social component is therefore specific to the
space in which people interact with media.
With the proliferation of electronic mobile media, this adoption into electronic
temporality can happen at any place and at any time and may include our own past self as a
character (in our own home videos or social media posts). Jason Farman includes in his
introduction to Mobile Interface Theory the similarities between mobile media and cinema, but
he explains the type of temporality afforded by mobile media as immediate, “immediacy
privileges a seamless connection to our media so that they fluidly integrate with our bodies and
our surroundings,” as viewers are transported into the space of the narrative.79 I use the word
space instead of time because Farman theorizes that all temporal interactions happen in certain
spaces. In these spaces, the virtual and the material worlds collide because we can embody both
spaces fluidly. Bolter and Grusin, in discussing remediation and immediacy, say that media
“attempts to achieve immediacy by ignoring or denying the presence of the medium and the act
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of mediation.”80 To achieve immediacy, the connection between the virtual and material spaces
becomes invisible.
This invisibility works twofold for the viewer. For one, it makes the social component
possible, which I will refer to as participation. This type of participation can simply mean using
and interacting with forms of media. On another level, participation only happens through the
use of the senses and the possibility for affectual responses (I will go into this in the first section
of Part 1).81 But invisibility also allows for a synchronization of consciousness that is entangled
with capitalist consumerism. The synchronization of consciousness is how Bernard Stiegler
argues that marketers and dominant institutions attempt to control societies. In the second half of
the 20th century, people tuned into the same television programs at the same times. Individual
consciousnesses, then, came to expect certain visuals similar to everyone else, or essentially no
one.82 In Stiegler’s theory, we lose the ability to understand depth and time. We react within a
technical grammatization, similar to the pheromones that lead ants’ decisions i.e., by our
consumption-driven roles.
From an individual viewer’s perspective, this synchronization may include interpellation.
Interpellation happens when viewers relate to a certain character or theme and “recognize
themselves as subjects through ideology.”83 This is a powerful tool for both marketers and artists.
For artists working against control societies, including some film writers, interpellation provides
people with new ways of thinking as well as chances to empathize with viewpoints that are
otherwise impossible. However, with consciousness synchronized by the increasing presence of

80

Jay Bolter and Richard Grusin, Remediation: Understanding New Media, (MIT Press, 2000), 11.
Stiegler also borrows this term from Leroi-Gourhan in Symbolic Misery: Vol. 2 in the chapter “Sensing through
Participation.”
82
Stiegler, Vol. 1, 20.
83
“Interpellation,” The Chicago School of Media Theory, University of Chicago, 2018,
https://lucian.uchicago.edu/blogs/mediatheory/keywords/interpellation/
81

26

media, all temporal aesthetics have the ability to shape, contort, and create ideologies for viewers
that they both relate to and are subjected by simultaneously.
When people are subject to temporal aesthetics in the whirlwind of consumerism, they
lose the ability to create singularity. Singularity is the attachment of aesthetics to singular objects
that are experienced when we desire and are fulfilled by the unexpected. Stiegler argues that the
ability to create singularity is threatened by the proliferation of media for the purposes of
marketing. In the age of electronic media, our exposure to the audiovisual can create an
overwhelming sense of loss because marketing thrives on consumerist expectations. Without
experiencing new forms of aesthetics that create affectual response, we never experience the
unexpected and in turn lose our desire to project ourselves or participate.84
This can happen in all forms of media, but for Steigler, the cinematic experience can
work counter to, or disrupt, consumer-based media. As compared to most electronic media that
foster the reuse and re-articulation of the old for the benefit of capitalistic growth, the adoption
of temporality in the cinema creates the potential for singularity. Stiegler argues that with
cinema, we move into the world of the movie. He gives the example of someone who enters the
movie theater, sits in an uncomfortable chair, with a toothache, and annoyed with someone at
work. After the movie starts, they forget about the chair, tooth, and annoying coworker. Stiegler
says that “you are no longer in your body; you are in the screen. You have adopted the time of
the film.”85 I acknowledge that the cinema experience can also be interrupted, but, even if I hear
a cough during minute 45, I was fully immersed up to that point and quickly return to the
temporality soon after.
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Like television, the cinema involves an adoption of the audiovisual by the consciousness
of the viewer, but there are important differences. The cinematic experience allows for different
expected desires to create a participatory response when faced with the unexpected. This
experience connects the aesthetic film to the audience as a “we.” In contrast, the unexpected does
not happen with consumerism. Instead of a singular “we” in one moment, a synchronized
consciousness across multiple spaces is that of “no one.” With television and other electronic
media, there is a never-ending explosion of temporalities that attempt to relate to the viewer as
well as change and warp their sense of a past. The important thing to consider is how our
relationship with the audiovisual is under threat by dominant institutions, but keep in mind that
there are always ways of interacting with temporalities that are participatory and productive.
Singular Memory
The idea of a singularity touches on an important question: if we embody certain
narratives through cinema, television, or mobile media, then once these temporal moments pass,
how do we remember them? Are they remembered as part of everyday life? Are we able to
separate the themes, ideas, and language of the media from our other temporal experiences in a
particular time period in our past? If not, the establishment of control societies has unlimited
potential; the way we interact, dream, and desire would be continuously rewritten to meet the
current capitalist goals.86 However, I will argue that certain memories are separate from, though
affectually related to, our interactions with all forms of the audiovisual. In the same breath, I
must acknowledge that memory is inherently fickle. Memories can change over time and are not
always reliable. But before I discuss my own concepts relating to memory, I will first discuss
other theories that describe the relationships between memory and media.
While I use this from Stiegler, I also am influenced by Gilles Delueze, “Postscript on the Societies of Control,”
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Stiegler refers to memories that are formed through technologies as tertiary memories. If
I lived in a certain house for many years, I will have many memories of it. But if I see a video of
the house, the video is remembering the house for me. This limits the memories I had before
seeing the video. Stiegler argues that tertiary memories set the horizon, or potential expectations,
for our secondary retentions, which are recalled in our imagination. We also have primary
retentions which are what we must remember in a particular moment in order to react. We
always filter these primary retentions through our secondary retentions, but we learn these
secondary retentions from tertiary retentions or the memories of other temporalities. Our tertiary
memories, then, through the filter of primary and secondary retentions, affect our everyday
interactions and choices. This includes how we identify ourselves, imagine our futures, and
choose what to believe—within a certain limited number of possibilities.
Stiegler argues that tertiary memories can limit the singularity of our memories when
television or film remembers for us. We all exist in the present only in relation to the past. But in
any culture, the past is always rewritten by new writers/creators. Stiegler explains the importance
of memories using John Locke’s idea that “I am singular through the singularity of the objects
with which I am in relation.”87 Essentially, when we are unable to attach certain aesthetics to
ourselves, we no longer have singular pasts. Not only are we subject to synchronized
temporalities, but because of interpellation, we envelope and perpetuate the themes and values of
dominant institutions as the sights and sounds of our past are transformed in new contexts for
marketing purposes. A people without singularity fall subject to the formation of a historic
cultural memory that relies solely on the evolving representations in all political and rhetorical
discourses.
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In this sense, memories of films affect even our most intimate reactions and responses.
The important point to consider is that all of our temporal activities affect our future selves. But a
film is not always remembered “correctly” or in its totality. Victor Burgin argues in The
Remembered Film that our past is intermingled with our own experiences as well as experiences
we have seen on screen. This may include a billboard, commercial, or the thousands of places to
scroll through information on the internet. Burgin quotes Jean Laplanche who explains memory
and fantasy, “as a ‘time of the human subject’ that the individual ‘secretes’ independently of
historical time. Temporal ‘secretions’ very often combine memories and fantasies with material
from films and other media sources.”88 This theory shows how memories of multiple
temporalities will inevitably change and warp. Therefore, the synchronization of consciousness
can be broken up by these multiple interactions; the “we” that developed by the viewing will
inevitably differ. Still, this theory assumes that the unconscious mind will work against the
powers of dominant institutions naturally. There is no participatory element and, although true,
can still create a limited number of tertiary possibilities and lead to a lack of singularity.
Most films are created and marketed by Hollywood or other major production companies.
Because of increasing wealth and resources, Hollywood is able to create larger markets, better
quality of films, and recruit (subjectively) better actors. Roland Barthes acknowledges the
possibility of a “third meaning” for viewing—one that is different from hegemonic viewing and
unable to be described with language—but he admits that common responses to films can come
from emotions that derive from, “an average effect, almost from a certain training.”89 This
training shows how Hollywood movies establish hegemonic discourses and themes for viewers.
If we cannot differentiate our memories outside of technically produced tertiary memories, then
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we have no ability to critique the discourse of media. The repercussions of this possibility have
unlimited potential as we are exposed to new marketing rhetoric and films on a daily basis.
Although not in all cases, I agree with Stiegler’s theory of synchronized consciousness in the
sense that this synchronization is Hollywood and television’s ultimate goal. With this in mind,
this paper discusses the relationship between Hollywood films and the formation of memories.
Through the framework of affect theory, I understand the concern of dominant institutions
controlling affect, but I also continue the argument that by understanding the development of
memory, and creating habits that foster their growth, new affects can be produced through
certain types of cognitive and bodily participation.
Participation
Stuart Hall’s notion of “decoding” contends that viewers do not always interpret films in
the way they were “encoded” to be understood.90 Even if we do decode them as intended, our
initial decoding of a film can change as we interact with other media in new spaces. This is
because we do not always remember the narrative or even the viewing experience. Burgin argues
that the narrative of a film does not matter as much as our affectual responses to it: “the more the
film is distanced in memory, the more the binding effect of the narrative is loosened.”91 The
combination of films and everyday life create an array of associations and ideologies that are
different from the original viewing.92 Burgin explains that films are not remembered by everyone
in the same way, “consciousness may be synchronized in a shared moment of viewing, but the
film we saw is never the same as the one I remember.”93 Burgin further discusses the way movies
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can be refigured by the unconscious as we are reminded of films in association with other
moments in our lives. This happens within other media spaces that we encounter on a daily basis.
With new forms of media allowing people to interact in new spaces, the amount of spaces
to contest hegemonic discourses has increased. Giving grassroots artists the technology
necessary to create, parody, and manipulate Hollywood films has created what Henry Jenkins
refers to as “convergence culture”; this is when dominant institutions and grassroots individuals
contribute ideas back and forth across local cultures and nationalities.94 When we encounter
representations of convergence culture, memory associations that we have with certain aesthetic
objects can change. A parody or a reinterpretation of a film from grassroots artists has the power
to change the type of interpellation that takes place for the viewer. This creates breaks up grand
narratives into smaller subjective experiences. Mobile media platforms are battlegrounds for
ideologies because they allow for branches of thought to grow from the original Hollywood
creations. The key to convergence culture is access to technologies and the participation in the
convergence process. Although Hollywood movies have more money, resources, and often better
quality of films, the proliferation of new media allows grassroots artists to create new viewing
experiences. With that being said, it is extremely important to understand that wherever the
spaces of the masses are interacting (e.g. YouTube), marketers from Hollywood will soon
involve themselves in these spaces.
As new technologies provide new spaces for interaction, Hollywood marketers find new
ways to impact the consciousness and ideologies of viewers. But memories of these films do not
always have to establish hegemonic ideologies. In Part 1: Hollywood Sequels, I explain one
possible relationship between memory and media with the creation of the term staple associative
memory (SAM). To foreshadow, these are memories of moments that are in association with
94
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films but have a specific social component separate from the media itself. In the second half of
Part 1, I intend to show how Hollywood tries to re-establish their relevance through certain types
of films. This is being done in a particular way through the use of the film sequel. The sequel
works in a number of effective ways, but one important development is the use of old scenes
directly placed into sequels. The use of old scenes in new films has become easier with the
creation of new technologies, most importantly the use of digital actors. While this may be seen
only as a plot device, I want to argue that it has larger implications for the way we remember.
When we see old scenes or characters—either the original actors or digital models—the films
either replace or reconstruct the memory of the original film. This works counter to the creation
of singularity for viewers. An example of this potential is the sequel to the movie Blade Runner
(1982), a film set in the futuristic year 2019. The sequel, Blade Runner 2049 (2017), will be the
text I center my ideas on throughout the work.
Both the creation of staple associative memories and Hollywood’s attempts to diminish
and erase these personal histories are discussed within the framework of affect theory. I do this
by trying to pay close attention to intimate, social, and specific ways of interacting in the world.
At the end of Part 1, I discuss how the use of affective methodologies can benefit the individual
reader in their own life, as well as how scholars may use the phrase in their own work. In the
ideological split between the importance of cognitive or bodily affects described in Affective
Methodologies, I lean toward the cognitive, but I also rely on the need for social participation—
which inherently includes both affectual bodily and cognitive responses. By the end, I hope my
discussion of staple associative memory will open up new possibilities for other people
interested in cinema, memory studies, and affect theory.
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In the second chapter, I will move away from the cinema and discuss other spaces of
media consumption, focusing on Netflix. I argue that Netflix also can create embodiment and
singularity. And there may be a social component embedded in the watching as viewers decide
when and where they want to watch. But they are also enveloped into the fantasy world of
television in specific ways, ultimately leading to a synchronization of consciousness and new
forms of dominant interpellation. Using the television show The Office, I explore the way that
breaking the fourth wall in television can entice the viewer into certain ways of watching. As
others have done before me, I argue that in order to critique hegemony, people must interact with
media in a critical way. Seeing a movie for the first time subjects the viewer to the narrative of
the director/writer because we desire the revealing of the story. If the original viewing of a film
is an embodiment of the film, then the control is in the hands of the creator. While this can lead
to the unexpected, it also fails to differentiate the writer’s intent or the source of the art. The
goal, then, is to rethink or critique the first viewing experience by recognizing the power of
affect in establishing memories.
I end the work with a discussion of Blade Runner 2049 as a science fiction model for real
world technology, focusing on the artificially intelligent character, Joi. Joi is the companion to
the main character, Kay, but she exists only as a projected form of augmented reality. While
other films have included artificially intelligent love interests (Her 2013 and Ex Machina 2014
come to mind), the use of an augmented reality character has particular relevance to the future of
film. By this, I mean the chance for films to enter into the spaces of the material world through
the use of augmented reality. Films entering into spaces outside of theater create the possibility
for new ways of viewing films in a critical way, but they also allow for potential negative
repercussions like the control of movement. The use of this type of character also does a degree
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of cultural work by foreshadowing potential future technologies and creating a certain real-life
potential for the technology. In this last section, I will include my thoughts about memory for
the future of media.
Real-world Application
I believe my work is necessary for a few reasons. One, the evolution of media continues
rapidly, and therefore needs to be critiqued as it evolves. Two, I believe I can help extend an
explanation for how Hollywood creators are threatening further hegemony by reusing old scenes
and making movies that parallel watch time and destroy singularity. Many scholars have argued
that global capitalism no longer fights strictly over materials in a Marxian sense but over
consciousness.95 Stiegler says that it is “television’s vocation to synchronize individual
temporalities of consciousness so as to constitute global markets . . . with a view to accentuating
their massively consumerist expectations.”96 Although movies have the ability to critique this
temporal synchronization, I argue that Hollywood also plays a role in creating a specific and
controlled temporality.
Within the vein of affect theory, I also acknowledge my own role in the creation of this
work. I try to follow the goals laid out in Affective Methodologies by recognizing my situational
position as a researcher and producer of knowledge.97 I have a personal connection to Blade
Runner. My brothers and dad like it, I like it, and I was interested when the sequel was released.
My admittance of this film as one of personal importance may create a certain bias to my
writing, but I believe we only write when we are affected by something anyway. I also believe I
am at a crux in my life as a writer: I am learning and reading about more complex and theoretical
ideas which have allowed me to at least associate with other academic writers. At the same time,
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I struggle with certain readings and concepts. While this may discredit some of my work, I
believe this crux is valuable. Partly from my readings of feminist scholarship, I strive to keep at
least one foot on each side of the theory/academia and method/activist “dichotomies.”98 This
includes being reflexive, acknowledging potentially juxtaposing ideas, and being accountable for
my methods and the sources of my ideas. On one side of the spectrum is the world of theorists
from where, eventually, it may be difficult to return. If I were to return, it would be to the life of
a person swept away uncritically in the technologies, social situations, and products that most
people consume at face value. My work hopefully bridges an invisible gap that I believe exists
between the people who live without questioning and those who feel compelled to read for the
sake of learning and change.
In sum, I hope my work uses relatable language for many readers and provides insights
into everyday living and ways for thinking about the future. Whether or not my analysis is
effective, I want reiterate now and at the end how much I believe that there is an ongoing battle
over memories that will invariably affect the future. Without singularity, we lose the ability to
find value in the idea of knowing we have a bond with singular objects and a specific past;
Stiegler calls this self-love. This affects cultural as well as individual identity, how we interact
in a community, as well as the ability to learn, create discourses, and collaborate in the spaces
that we work and live.
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Part 1: Hollywood Sequels
Staple Associative Memory
When the television entered into middle class homes in the 1950s, viewers were
subjected to what, when, and how to watch: one of three stations, at a scheduled time, and
according to the director’s will. With electronic media, the scheduled time frames have changed,
and the options for what to watch have expanded. But the ability to connect to an aesthetic object
is even harder as we are exposed to more images than ever before. Marketing has grown and
infiltrated our most intimate spaces. One of Stiegler’s main arguments is that that the cinema is
“par excellence the aesthetic experience able to fight aesthetic conditioning on its own terrain.”99
It stands to reason that if the experience in the theater is threatened then the ability to counter
aesthetic conditioning becomes more difficult. Unfortunately, this is the role of the movie sequel.
By revisiting and reusing old characters and scenes, the movie sequel distorts the singular
connection to a past aesthetic (the original film). By paralleling watch time, the sequel feels
natural to the viewer, but like television, this parallel is an attempt to reinsert the control over
time. When we watch a sequel, we are not only being shown when, what, and how to watch but
more importantly when, what, and how to remember. With no differentiation of memories, we
are subjected to the themes and ideologies of the newest versions. As history scholars attest,
history is continuously re-written, so the control of individual memories affects the creation of
ideologies in the future.
Sequels are different from a remake or a story that has been passed down through
generations. All art steals from the past in some way and there are certain archetypes that are
consistent in films, but every culture must rearticulate what has come before in a new form.
Sometimes the reuse of an old story just needs a new technology like “digital re-mastering” or
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“3D glasses,” and other times the characters may need an updated setting as with the reiteration
of Romeo and Juliet directed by Baz Luhrman in 1996. These are remakes that audiences
understand as such. People enjoy new versions, but they do not necessarily erase or change a
previous experience with the story. Rearticulating or remaking art takes on many forms, but
before the photograph, the ability to rearticulate was strictly in the physical hands of the artist.
Walter Benjamin, in his seminal works on mechanical reproduction, explains how a painting or
sculpture was never exactly the same and always fit into an historical moment.100 Whereas the
photograph and cinema allow for art to be mechanically reproduced, electronic media gives
marketers the ability to reproduce art increasingly easier and faster.
Passing down representations of cultural artifacts has changed with electronic media. The
creation of a piece of art and when someone views it is often flattened onto one moment. As
Benjamin understood, this makes art lose its historical relevance. Greg Ulmer extends Paul
Virilio’s argument that art in the electronic age moves at the speed of light. This has created what
Ulmer refers to as “now time,” which explains the technological ability to experience an
overwhelming number of past aesthetic objects whenever we want.101 With electronic media, any
temporal art can be used again in a new context. This includes songs, television, and movies. As
discussed above, sounds and images are reused and reconfigured in a never-ending loop of
temporal synchronization. But the variety of electronic media has also allowed for the mixing of
temporalities. I argue that this has opened up new possibilities for establishing connections with
aesthetics objects.
Because of different platforms for viewing or listening, the temporalities of movies and
songs can be intertwined with other daily activities. These movies or songs are experienced for
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multiple hours of people’s lives. If I spend four hours listening to music throughout the day,
then I spend four hours meshing my other temporalities with that of the temporalities of the
songs. Vivian Sobchack explains this as a combination of objective time and the subjective time,
and that “we understand that these two structures exist simultaneously in a demonstrable state
of discontinuity as they are, nonetheless, actively and constantly synthesized as coherent in a
specific lived-body experience (emphasis in original).”102 Therefore, these moments are
remembered together as combined and intermixed temporal moments of our pasts. With this in
mind, we may conclude that the temporality of a song is only partially embodied by the listener
as other senses are used to move throughout the day.
Navigating and filtering these temporalities has become a necessary skill in the 21st
century. Ulmer contends that judging electronic media includes more of the senses than ever
before, but some temporalities overwhelm others, often when art is objectively beautiful. He uses
Kant’s idea that we all recognize beauty as a common thread, regardless of language. Ulmer
states that “‘Beauty’ is not a property of an object or thing, but a feeling by which subjects
become aware of a harmony among their own faculties. A concept or rule is lacking for the
feeling.”103 Upon recognizing beauty in a song or moment of a film, these moments become part
of an individual’s memories. These moments are affectual responses, but they happen within a
combination of specific emotional or physical states that were already present. I may be listening
to the most objectively beautiful song, but if I am distracted by a family emergency, the song
may be ignored. When I hear the song later, I may not recognize it, or I will associate it with an
emergency. This means that the memories associated with electronic temporalities will differ
when combined with everyday activities. Even in a similar physical location like Georgia,
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different viewers will have experienced media in different contexts. As Burgin explains, two
people may both see a film together, yet one person remembers the film forever and the other
forgets it the next day.
Movies that are important to any one individual’s past are identified by what Walter
Benjamin calls “purposive remembering.”104 When we like a film or have a particular affectual
response to a scene, we will remember it when triggered by something later in life. After more
than one viewing of a film, the narrative solidifies in our memory. Although no one remembers a
film perfectly, this solidification is important. On second viewing, we know the plot and the
narrative and are no longer anticipating the next temporal moment. In one sense, the movie is
objectified and solidified as an aesthetic. When experienced in a particular moment in the
presence of a sensible group, this creates the singularity of “we.”
When I was growing up, I was able to watch my favorite movies over and over again. I
still find myself quoting lines from Robin Hood on a daily basis. But I do not confuse moments
of this film from other moments in my life; I am fully aware that I am quoting the movie and
what part of the film I am quoting. Through repetition, I was affected by the film in new and
interesting ways. In Absent Minded Media, Ben Highmore discusses how ordinary daily life is
filled with small beauties. Through the habitual interaction with the ordinary, we open up to new
ways of thinking; for me, the habit-like viewing of Robin Hood allowed for a different way of
remembering it.105 Instead of being a memory of the film, this memory is triggered by the film,
but I associate it with a certain space in the past. With this type of memory, I favor the temporal
experiences outside of the film as compared to the film itself or some unidentifiable combination
of the film and another event in the unconscious.
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This type of memory also happens with songs. Some songs always remind us of specific
experiences in our past. As we engage in our daily lives listening to songs, we are participating
in other activities as well (although songs are temporal, they do not always have narratives,
which makes less to embody by the listener and more potential for other associations; for this
reason, the song example may be more relatable). The important component of this type of
memory is that we listened to the song or watched the film multiple times. Through repetition,
we re-situate the beauty in the film or song and associate it with other interactions. Only by
solidifying the narrative in our minds can we disestablish ourselves from the attempt to
synchronize temporality by consumer media. Instead, we focus on other aspects of life during
that time. I call this type of memory a staple associative memory or SAM.
In this definition, I use the word staple because certain films are stapled onto certain
periods of life. Unless we have another period where we watch the movie over and over again,
the film will always remind of us a particular experience or space. Associative refers to anything
that is outside of the narrative itself. These memories exist in my imagination not only beyond
the viewing experience but to other things in my life I associate with that time period. The details
of the film take secondary status to my own associations with the film. This is just one example
of many movies in my past that are not just movies but triggers for other times in my life.
Understandably, the strength of these associations may vary, which may be based on the
type of platform we experience the combination of temporalities. When we watch with other
people at home or listen to music on the go, we increase the chance for other temporal
associations. These memories may connect to a positive or negative event in our memory and
may be purely affectual, narrative-based, specific, or general. But regardless of the emotion or
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narrative in our memory, these memories connect specific aesthetics to certain feelings; they
extend us away from the temporality of the audiovisual object and become specific to our lives.
Just because people in a certain geographic place may be exposed to similar films does
not mean that each film had the same effect on each viewer. The first exposure to a film is “a
powerful bond,” but with only one viewing, a sequel can alter or erase the original.106 Therefore,
to firmly establish singularity, there may need to be more attempts and stronger associations.
When we see a movie multiple times, the subjective temporality of inhabiting the world of the
film changes from the original. Any of these viewing experiences may trigger the associative
connection, but regardless, the film returns to a piece of art, as an object, and it is associated with
other temporalities in our past separate from the film viewing experience.
I mentioned that one of my SAMs is triggered by Robin Hood. This film has become part
of my past and establishes my selfhood. By having this film in my past, I attach an aesthetic to
my past. It is just one memory of many that makes me feel unique. This film may lead to a staple
associative memory for someone else, but that person will decode it differently and relate it to a
different time in their past. This creates singularity to a certain aesthetic and also to a particular
space. To explain with an example, if I watch a film for the first time but my grandfather has
already seen it, we may embody the film similarly upon that single viewing experience, but our
memories of the watching the film, in conjunction with all of our other memories, will invariably
differ. This difference is positive because it allows for a singularity in the moment but a different
association across generations. As new films are produced with new writers, new memories are
associated with old ones, even if we watch movies out of the order that they are released in
watch time.
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The next few sections discuss the relationship between Hollywood writers, producers,
marketers and anyone else who has seen Hollywood movies. The alignment of watch time with
film sequels is one of the ways Hollywood attempts to threaten attachment to originals. In
specific ways, Blade Runner 2049 threatens the possibility of having staple associative memories
that have formed in specific contexts and been remembered at different times in different spaces.
In the context of “now time,” different memories that lead to creations of different identities can
be manipulated and reconfigured by Hollywood movie sequels.
Threatening Staple Associative Memories
Establishing staple associative memories is not a simple process because we need a
combination of beauty and multiple views in order to solidify the text as an objective narrative.
Also, just because we have these memories does not decrease our desire to see new movies. In a
society driven by marketing, we want to see the newest releases. As Stiegler notes, as singular
pasts are threatened, people try to differentiate themselves with products. This process of loss
and consumption is a never-ending cycle, but the mentality stems partly from the American
values of individuality as well as the growth of capitalism common in the Western world.
The constant release of new movies and songs are reminders that there is more to be
experienced. Richard Lanham calls this the desire of the rhetorical life: a rhetorical person
desires pleasure, winning, persuasion, and progress. This rhetorical desire works as the opposite
of philosophy. He argues that we oscillate between the rhetorical/particular and
philosophical/essences.107 I see these terms relate to art in the following way: new art is
rhetorical, whereas art in a staple associative memory is philosophical. Stiegler argues that the
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“particularization of the singular is its annulment.”108 Essentially, the essence of a past is reused
in a rhetorical context as objects serve particular purposes in the flow of marketing.
Having a list of staple associative memory texts makes people feel like they have lived,
have worth, and that they have been through something that they can connect with at any future
moment. Even without an actual list of art, people realize they have these texts when they see an
old movie they have not seen in years that they used to love. They become simultaneously
excited and nostalgic by understanding the old film as being part of a unique historical period.
This unique historical period, of which all historical periods are, must be considered only as a
memory or in relation to the past, but it cannot overlap with any other past. If it overlaps, it
devalues the experience and is forgotten. When we no longer associate a film with a period, we
do not keep that period as part of our evolving creation of selfhood.
The ability to threaten these memories comes from the ability to reuse audiovisual art in
new contexts. Stiegler claims that recorded song was the most important musical event in the
20th century because “masses of ears suddenly started to listen to music—endlessly.”109 He uses
the film Same Old Song as an example of how the reuse of music has both a binding effect on
viewers but also creates an “ill-being.”110 In the film, the actors mime well-known songs in Paris.
The songs create an “avalanche of ghostlike returns” which helps establish a connection with the
audience in that particular space; this is a step in the direction of creating a singular “we.”111 But
because of the reuse of old songs, this connection creates a disgust or realization of a negative
type of reuse of the old songs. The reuse of old songs destroys the change of a “we” in
association with any particular song. If everything is just reused, there is no singular. The film
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may make people feel as if all old songs are unworthy or undesirable, which in turn creates a
questioning of self worth.
I agree with Stiegler that the reuse of the past can create an ill-being, but the viewers of
Same Old Song become aware of the ill-being early in the process of viewing. They know that
the movie revolves around the novel idea to reuse old songs in a new context. This allows for
people to dissociate themselves from the temporality of the film and critique this component.
With an understanding of staple associative memories, the concern I have with Stiegler’s use of
Same Old Song as an example is that staple associative memories may not be threatened. Stiegler
notes that the memories of the songs are “sometimes very vague—floating memories,” and this
understanding of memory is what creates the ill-being.112 Texts that are attached to SAMs are not
vague or floating (although they may evolve). For some of the songs in the movie, they will
produce a floating memory, but for ones that have strong affectual associations with them, these
memories will pull the viewer toward the associations with those songs again.
The fact that the original song created an affectual response is what will sustain the
staple, regardless of a single reminder or adoption of temporality of the song later (the situation
that Same Old Song creates). In Volume 2, Stiegler describes how important participation is in
establishing singularity. Singularity is established because of sensory participation. The ability to
sense only comes from a production of the self by “acting out” in response to an aesthetic.113
This participation is what creates SAMs.
This is all to say, if I were to watch Same Old Song, I might have certain songs that
already included SAMs, and I would be attracted to them again, just as I was initially. I am
attracted because I know my song/s better, and I have already attached them to particular
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associations in my past. Once I realize that the songs are mimed, reproduced, and unattached, the
association I had with the original SAM will remain relatively intact.114 The example of Same
Old Song is clearly a reproduction of songs, which creates the ill-being. People are aware that the
songs are being reused, which allows for a conscious refusal of these new renditions as valid. In
sum, there can be a push-back by viewers from adopting the temporalities, and therefore they do
not have any participation or critique of the film.
Another type of audiovisual scenario, though, may not allow for a conscious push-back:
learning that a song samples from another song. If I hear a song that gives me pleasure, only to
find that the chorus has been sampled from a previous generation, this may create an
embarrassment from being tricked when I am finally made aware. This scenario is the epitome of
Stiegler’s ill-being because I have been tricked by the creators. This embarrassment may produce
a strong affect and a memorable one at that.
Listeners react this way because they believe strongly in two ideas. One idea is that they
live in a particular historical moment different from any that came before. The other idea is that
they have a past specific to their own formation of selfhood. When I watch a film multiple times,
I no longer am subject to the films temporality but have extended the film into other temporal
moments associated with the watching of the film in a specific space in my past; I appreciate my
staple association memories. No one remembers watching Robin Hood in their memory in the
same way that I do. This means that the memory is part of my individual selfhood. It becomes
incomparable.115 Although I may not control when or in what context I hear the song later, the
memory association is relatively intact or stapled.
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Both Same Old Song and Blade Runner 2049 are examples of control over consciousness
and memory. But in the case of Same Old Song, the audience is aware that the songs are being
reused, so hearing the old songs may not produce as much of an affect, which comes through
sensory participation. This lack of participation is also Stiegler’s point, but my tangential point is
that Same Old Song may not create an ill-being; it may just be remembered as a novelty or not at
all. However, similar to the surprise from learning a song uses a sample, Blade Runner 2049
does create an affect of surprise for the viewer by using old scenes in new contexts. These scenes
are not the focal point or the novelty of the film; any viewer would never expect to see them.
Therefore, because these scenes create an intense surprise, they have the potential to erase the
original affects, which erases the original affectual attachment to Blade Runner.
Through this technique, the original scene that created the affect and in turn SAM can
create a strong enough affect to reconfigure the original memory of the scene. Consumer culture
thrives on the idea of the new, and it works increasingly hard to value the new over the old. In
many cases, marketers attempt to use the old in new contexts to flatten the experiences of
multiple generations. Different generations most easily identify through visual representations
and temporal objects that are specific to each generation: this includes any artistic visuals. These
differences are crucial for growth into new societies by combining, understanding, and creating
cross-generational discourses. But these differences can be threatened by Hollywood, which is
why we need to articulate the threat and try to establish memories attached to specific aesthetic
objects. If the memories or differences become obsolete, the potential for a control society based
on specific norms becomes all the more real.
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The Evolution of Blade Runner
The original Blade Runner was released in 1982 and featured a dystopian future in the
year 2019, with the popular actor Harrison Ford in the lead role of Deckard. Deckard’s job is to
hunt down and retire rogue replicants, android-like beings who look like humans but are used as
workers/slaves. On his mission, he falls in love with Rachael, a replicant who does not know she
is a replicant. In Blade Runner 2049, Rachael is no longer alive because she died giving
childbirth. The lead character and blade runner, Kay, is a new, more controlled version of a
replicant. These new models of replicants were created by Niander Wallace, a technological
genius who wants to expand his number of replicant slaves to conquer new worlds. He is
attempting to find Rachael’s child to understand replicant reproduction and create more slaves.
At one point in the film, Kay believes he might be the child of Rachael, and with his augmented
reality girlfriend Joi, must track down the answers to his and Deckard’s pasts.
For many works of art, electronic media or otherwise, the original release may not be
seen by many people. My dad saw the original Blade Runner in the theater, but the majority of
viewers did not receive it well, as shown by critical response and a low box office total. The film
made a measly 6 million dollars and was gone from theaters in a week.116 When I saw the film
approximately 20 years after the original release, I experienced it in a very different social,
material, and emotional state than my dad. But technologies do not evolve in the same way as
organisms. Belinda Barnet discusses how technical objects evolve and how we might trace their
evolution, “Technical machines can reappear, borrow from each other across branches, and then
rapidly evolve in a single generation.”117 But for the viewer, everything “new” feels like a
natural evolution. Marketers try to create seamless transitions that parallel watch time. Therefore,
Brian Raftery, “The Replicant: Inside the Dark Future of Blade Runner 2049,” (Wired, 2017).
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where Blade Runner 2049 fits into the historical time period is very important for how it is
written, marketed, and branded. The idea of a new film entices the desire of the consumer. No
longer seen as purely art, both movies become part of the stepping stones in the synchronization
of consciousness. This synchronization promotes the new and rewrites the old in the process.
One way to look at how Hollywood builds brands is by tracing the historical lineage of a
film. The original Blade Runner is based on the novel Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? by
Philip K. Dick published in 1968 (which is based on other science fiction narratives and ideas).
When I search it on Amazon.com, the most recent additions include the title at the top, but then
below in a bigger font, “the inspiration for the films Blade Runner and Blade Runner 2049.” The
most recent film iterations of the story take precedent over the book, even though the movies
vary significantly from the original. The Amazon reviewer writes:
Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? is a book that most people think they
remember and almost always get more or less wrong. Ridley Scott's film Blade
Runner took a lot from it, and threw a lot away. Wonderful in itself, the film is a
flash thriller, whereas Dick's novel is a sober meditation. As we all know, bounty
hunter Rick Deckard is stalking a group of androids who have returned from
space with short life spans and murder on their minds—where Scott's Deckard
was Harrison Ford, Dick's is a financially strapped municipal employee with bills
to pay and a depressed wife (emphasis added).118
The reviewer makes assumptions about the reader based on a shared historical watch time. They
assume that if we are reading this excerpt then we have seen the film. Paradoxically, they claim
that people typically remember the book wrong, while assuming that we have all seen the movie
correctly because “we all know.” They are favoring the most recent cultural artifact over another
and rewriting the history of the film. This otherwise insignificant review is just one an example
of how the old is seen as less valuable and can be replaced by the new through a slow
dismantling of the past.
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This type of assumption about the viewer narrows the amount of potential SAMs;
assuming there is one way of viewing a film or reading a book is detrimental to their creation.
Also, Blade Runner is not like other films; the movie is notorious for having multiple director’s
cuts. The movie has seven different cuts; the most recent one, and the one totally controlled by
director Ridley Scott, was released in 2007. From my own viewing, I would not describe the
replicants as “androids” nor as beings with “murder on their minds” but as beings looking for an
extension on life. Each of the different cuts of the film could have a different tagline. One
version creates a love story between Deckard and the replicant Rachael: they drive away into the
distance at the end of the film. Other versions bring into question whether or not Deckard
himself is a replicant through the use of a dream sequence featuring a unicorn. A dream with a
unicorn may signify a memory that is impossible and the possibility that his memories are also
implanted. For viewers, a storyline that has different plotlines depending on the version creates
the potential for more variations of affectual experiences. These critiques allow the interpretation
of the film to be in the hands of the viewer.
On the contrary, multiple versions may seem like a reuse of the old in the whirlwind of
consumption, and this argument is valid. But one must consider that Ridley Scott’s original
version was not released until 2007. This battle between producers and artist is telling. While we
can assume that Scott intended to create a memorable and singular viewing experience,
producers saw monetary value in the release of multiple versions. This of course is specific to
their current needs. Even as producers use different versions for monetary value, they eventually
sought to reconfigure the story and characters into a grand narrative. To do this, the writers of the
sequel pay strict attention to the timing and dates of the plotline and release.
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The movie is titled Blade Runner 2049, which is a very specific year in the future. The
date in and of itself has very little, if anything, to do with the plot itself. Including the year in the
title is part of the attempt to reestablish the “natural” timeline of history. On IMDB the synopsis
reads, “A young blade runner’s discovery of a long-buried secret leads him to track down former
blade runner Rick Deckard, who’s been missing for thirty years.” On the same IMDB page, the
storyline starts, “thirty years after the release of the first film, . . .” Do these tag lines mean thirty
years in the time of the movie or thirty years in watch time? Essentially, both may be true. The
original release was 1982 and the remake was in 2017, approximately 35 years apart. Through a
paralleling interval of time, creators assume the audience saw the movie 35 years ago. Instead of
acknowledging the multiple versions of the film, these taglines assume the world created in
Blade Runner has existed in some alternative space, and we now get a peek into a reality that
never stopped. This establishes a parallel universe, one that mirrors the thirty years that have
passed in the life of the viewer. The films marketers use this strategy because for many people,
the film is a memory of a certain time that is associated with a valued past. By showing that real
time has passed, the consumptive desire for the new overtakes any philosophical need for a
memory that is associated with a historical time period. This marketing of the movie manipulates
the when of watching the film because the experience parallels “natural” years of living.
Exploring “What” and “How” to Remember
If Blade Runner (1982) triggers a staple associative memory for someone, then they have
specific associations with the film and with the time period in their memory. As seen by its poor
reception, the film has many elements that did not fit into the expectations of the 1982 viewers,
which probably means that there are more chances for affectual response.119 The unexpected
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triggers affectual responses. Most genres are rather stable, but the elements of Blade Runner fit
into multiple genres—sci-fi, detective, romance. As stated above, Ridley Scott was not allowed
to release his original version. This proves how even popular writers are ultimately at the mercy
of larger Hollywood executives. While the original release did produce multiple moments of
beauty (arguably), the vision of the writer was compromised in order to fit into the mold of
normalized themes. For instance, in the theatrical release in 1982, Deckard and Rachael drive on
into the distance and fulfill their romance, whereas the final cut does not include this scene. This
fits into typical romance genres and tries to tame or control some of the more ambiguous
elements of the film. When themes are expected, they produce less affect in the viewer. The
flattening of affect exemplifies Hollywood’s desire to control the what and how of watching and
remembering in order to better commodify art.
In the fictional world, a blade runner is like a special investigator who hunts replicants,
futuristic beings who are almost indistinguishable from humans. Sobchack analyzes the original
Blade Runner in her own essay about memory and media. She explains how valuable a
photograph is for people’s understanding of selfhood. She explains this by using the moment
when Deckard tells Rachel that her photographs are not real: “Told that both her memory and its
material extroversion actually ‘belong to someone else,’ she not only becomes distraught but also
ontologically re-signed as someone who possesses no real life, no real history—although she still
remembers what she remembers, and the photographs still sit on her piano.”120 What we classify
as a real human is an important theme in Blade Runner.
In the world of replicants, there is an eternal struggle between humans and replicants who
seek better lives; therefore, Rachael giving birth changes the socially assumed belief that
replicants are lesser beings. If the replicants are able to have children, then they must have rights
120

Sobchack, 7.

52

as humans. In the film, Kay, the new blade runner, and Wallace, the new creator of replicants,
are both looking for Rachael’s child. Wallace wants the replicants to procreate so that they can
be his slaves for inhabiting new worlds. In order to do this, he captures Deckard to try to find out
where the replicant-child may be hiding. When Deckard and Wallace meet, a well crafted scene
asks the audience members to question their memories. Similar to the response Rachael has
about her fake photographs, the sequel also questions the validity of the memory of the original
film for the viewer i.e., a SAM—a singular past experience that creates selfhood.
Deckard’s Memories
As stated above, one of the long-standing debates of the film is whether or not the main
character, Deckard, is in fact a replicant. The sequel addresses this concern in a climactic
moment in the film. Sitting across from each other, Wallace shows Deckard a video of the
moment that Deckard first saw Rachael. In this moment, the viewers are also seeing the same
scene that they have seen before—one with a particularly objective beauty both in the form of
the woman and the cinematography. In the scene, Rachael is not walking toward Deckard in a far
away shot but walking toward the viewer. Just as Deckard is being forced to remember his
memory of Rachael, so are the viewers. In the film, Wallace questions Deckard’s memory of the
event:
Is it the same, now, as then? The moment you met her. All these years you looked
back on that day, drunk on the memory of its perfection ... how shiny her lips ...
how instant your connection. Did it never occur to you that was why you were
summoned in the first place? Designed to do nothing short of fall for her right
then and there. All to make that single perfect ... specimen.121
In this moment, we too are being asked to rethink our original memory in a new setting not only
within our own lives in a new theater or at home on the couch but also in the context of the
fantasy world that we now embody in that moment. The answer to the long-standing question is
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brought up by a character in the film. Essentially, Wallace attempts to answer the question posed
by the audiences over the last 30 years. In this moment we may ask ourselves, is Deckard a
replicant who was designed to fall in love with Rachael just to procreate? Questioning a longpending question can create a strong affect in the viewer.
The next scene is an interesting manipulation of time, space, and technology. Out of the
shadows, no longer on a hologram, a young, physical Rachael appears and walks toward
Deckard. Both the audience and Deckard know that this young Rachael cannot exist, but the film
uses a synthespian, an actor made to look like a real historic person that doesn’t actually exist.
Despite any longing for the character, both the audience and Deckard must quickly reconcile that
the original actress, Sean Young, cannot possibly look young again. Interestingly, for viewers
enveloped in the fantasy world, the potential to recreate a replicant that looks just like the
original Rachael is entirely possible within the confines of the replicant technology. The official
screenplay notes for the scene read, “A perfect recreation of all he ever wanted is right in front of
him. In the flesh. Instantly filled with longing. With disgust.” As she walks closer to him, the
notes then read, “we are transported back decades in seconds.”122 The use of “we” is
illuminating. Stiegler understands that when the audience exists as a “we,” they are subject to the
parallel consciousness of the film, which has powerful repercussions. Apparently, the writers
understand the power of this “we.” For the writers, this “we” includes any person that has ever
seen the film, but it simultaneously destroy the singularity of the original film. This shows how
they purposefully work within the understanding that new films replace or disfigure old ones and
destroy the singularity of aesthetics.
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In the film, Deckard walks away from the new Rachael replicant, citing that “her eyes
were green.”123 He is saying that he trusts his own memories, and he could never be convinced
otherwise. The screen notes say he is filled with “disgust,” a feeling the viewers may share. He is
promoting that any replication is unworthy and not the same. Yet by the very fact that the sequel
exists, the writers are asking the viewers to rethink their original memory. Deckard’s affectual
response to a different eye color, the basis for his rejection of Rachael, may not be as easy for the
viewers. If we can say that Rachael is a staple memory for Deckard in the same way that the
original Blade Runner movie is a staple associative memory aesthetic, neither Deckard nor the
audience can ever forget the possibility of another Rachael. This changes the narrative, character,
and understanding of the original story. By reusing old scenes, Blade Runner 2049 dramatically
changes the what and how of remembering the original film.
Kay’s Memories
Remembering also has plot significance for the main character, Kay. Whereas the first
film asks the questions of what classifies real humans, the sequel asks what classifies real
memories. At the beginning of the film, Kay, as a new model of replicant that must obey, is
aware that his memories are not his own i.e., that what he remembers was not lived by him. In
the same way that Stiegler discusses the ill-being or loss of narcissism, Kay takes no pride in
memories that are not his. He was given those memories; he therefore has does not associate
them with his selfhood. But, as the film continues, both he and the audience are led to believe he
might be the child born of Rachael, and Kay begins to question whether his memories may have
actually been lived by him.
Just like Rachael with her photographs, Kay claims ownership of the memory of a
wooden horse he had as a child. When he goes to the place he remembers hiding the horse, he
123
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finds it, so we assume this will validate that he was a child. But he still questions whether the
memory is an implant or not. As compared to Rachael whose past is threatened by a false
photograph in 1982, the 21st century viewer knows that many images and objects can be falsified
or manipulated. Kay, too, is unconvinced of the physical object as proof of a real past. So he
visits a memory creator for replicants, Ana Stelline, and asks her what makes memories “real.”
She says that her creations of memories seem real because “It feels authentic, and if you have
authentic memories, you have real human responses.” He replies, “How can you tell the
difference?” To which she explains, “We recall with our feelings, anything real should be a
mess.”
Kay only remembered pieces of his past, and because he was unclear about the memory,
he believed his false memories may have really happened to him. This is because the truths that
he had established about his memories were placed into a new context and given new
parameters. With multiple surprises throughout, when someone watches Blade Runner 2049,
they may also re-associate their original memory to that particular aesthetic and in turn lose their
sense of the object’s relationship to the past. The scenes in the film that once related to a specific
space in life are intermixed with a new space in life. This affects the ability to maintain staple
associative memory. The life associations with Blade Runner that were singular then become
disassociated in the mind of the viewer. This gives the power to create and control affectual
responses back into the hands of Hollywood. When my father and I watch the Blade Runner
2049 together in 2017, despite our different associations with the films in our memories, we
reenter into the world of blade runners and replicants as equals, equally susceptible and
malleable in an evolving temporal fantasy.
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Engaging Staple Associative Memory
Up to this point, it may seem like I am arguing that people should not watch Blade
Runner 2049 for fear of replacing the singularity of the original. This is not the case. On the
contrary, we must try to create opportunities for more staple associative memories. The idea of a
“mess” is not entirely true because it implies that memories are not at all reliant on the ways we
interact with media. Are memories only just a “mess” driven by emotions? There must be
something we can do to work toward a way of watching and interacting with films that does not
leave people spinning in the whirlwind of temporalities and consumption. I’ll put it in question
form: what can people do to navigate an environment where aesthetics are reused again and
again to satisfy the goals of marketing?
This question is not simple, but scholarship on affect theory may help initiate a path. As a
reminder, we must not lose sight of the fact that the memories in our past are most often
unreliable and malleable, but by paying attention to our own affectual responses, we recognize
their role in creating memories. In Ordinary Affects, Kathleen Stewart explores the various
affectual encounters people may have that shape understanding and action in the world. The
things we watch may either stick or not in unpredictable ways. She writes that ordinary affects
“pull the subject into places it didn’t exactly ‘intend’ to go.”124 The “unintended place” is one
way of understanding staple associative memories. When we are reminded of a film, the memory
of the film pulls us to some other social or affectual interaction. The key is that SAMs typically,
though not always, are created through a certain type of viewing experience: re-watching.
Re-watching involves making a choice. To find beauty in an aesthetic cannot be
controlled, but immersing ourselves into the artistic space can create a stronger connection to it,
a singularity, a purpose. Therefore, we must not be hesitant to interact with new forms of
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Kathleen Stewart, Ordinary Affects, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), 40.

57

aesthetics, but when we find something that produces a strong affect, we must cling to it. When
the affectual responses of joy, anger, sadness, surprise have been exhausted, move on to
something else. Once the affectual connection has been exhausted, the “space” we were listening
or watching becomes a new and different space with new temporalities. If I listen to the same
song for a week, that week has become its own space in my memory. When I recall the moment
at any point in the future, I am carried back to that space. Blade Runner 2049 may create a strong
affect for viewers, but to separate it from Blade Runner, we must associate the film with a
particular space in life so as not to differentiate the scenes, characters, and themes of both films.
By repetition, even with limited sensory participation, memories can be formed with specific
aesthetic objects.
To just say re-watching is purposively an oversimplification, but I keep it simple because
the aesthetic and affectual responses to films are important and must not be overcomplicated. To
overcomplicate the process of watching a film can take away from these responses and seem like
an attempt to control them. Instead of trying to find certain elements in a film, the goal is to
involve ourselves in spaces that can lead to something new and hopefully associative. The hope
is to move away from understanding objects as fixed but instead understand them as moving in
and out in a complex relationship.125 In order to do this, people must place themselves in spaces
that have social interaction between, around, and during the watching of films and other media.
Notice that I do not anticipate the creation of art by all people. While I certainly believe
everyone can and should create art, I also understand that it may not be interesting, exciting, or
even materially possible for all people. The goal is simply to accept our responses to art, endulge
them, and establish them as important pieces in our lives. If so compelled, walk out of the theater
and walk into another one, but find an art with an affect that breaks up the way consumption
125
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erases history.126 This will allow viewers to notice aspects of the film they did not notice the first
time watching; find subtle favorite, interesting, or surprising parts; or have a discussion about the
film over coffee the next morning. The staple associative memory may end up being this coffee
experience. When a person sees this film later playing on a subway, the plot is long forgotten,
but the sip of the coffee and the laugh of a friend return.
For scholars trying to understand the importance of staple associative memories, I believe
it starts with an understanding of memory as important in all contexts. Scholars like Greg Ulmer
and Elena Trivelli have encouraged analysis of affect during times of crisis or in extreme
situations, and their insights are eye-opening, but Ben Highmore and Kathleen Stewart’s studies
of the ordinary are also important. When trying to understand the formation of selfhood or a
culture more generally, the associations with films can create telling insights into what may seem
like insignificant memories. In one sense, they work as artifacts similar to a photograph but,
through their unique forms of beauty and temporality, can have a wider and more intimate range
of affects and associative stories.
With that being said, to study memories is inherently a difficult task. As Trivelli shows
us, the researcher must be allowed to let their own affectual responses guide their work—not
only to guide in predictable ways but to let these affects open up new ways of seeing the world.
In my own case, I started this project, consciously or unconsciously, in part because of my own
life. As I transition into new spaces and new jobs in graduate school, memories of my young life
weigh heavily on my mind. Halfway through this project, I helped my parents move out of my
childhood home. My mother played the same songs she has played since I was child as I sifted
through my collections and treasures. This experience helped me conceptualize between
126
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temporal and non-temporal artifacts as I cleared out old spaces where I used to live. As I listened
to music in the car, I tried to establish SAMs by listening to songs on repeat and sharing and
discussing them with other people. Of course, I have no way of knowing how these memories
will form without interacting in and through the new spaces I will inevitably visit in the future.
New media has allowed for these social interactions to take place in new spaces, but it
does not mean that all new media is inherently social or counter-hegemonic. We must critique
our own memories and identities and not take our memories for granted. It takes an active
participation in new spaces to engage in new ways of seeing the world. In the next section, I
discuss ways of interacting with media that are prone to conscious-adopting and the immersion
into the fantasy worlds of dominant Hollywood productions.
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Part 2: Alternative Media Platforms
Netflix
In the 21st century, the film industry has moved into the era of online streaming. The
stores of Hollywood Movies or Blockbusters no longer exist to offer “classic” films. While I still
have many DVDs, I watch them less that when I was a child. This lessens the amount of physical
artifacts that I retain from my past. As Stiegler explains, “the stability of the sense organs is an
illusion inasmuch as they are subjected to a never-ending process of defunctionalization and
refunctionalization which is tied, precisely, to the evolution of artifacts.”127 In the case of Netflix
originals, Amazon movies, and Hulu, the amount of old artifacts has become fewer, but the
control of the viewing experience has become greater. To note, these platforms can and will
evolve; the bigger concern is one of access to artifacts. As a child, I was able to create staple
association memories because I owned the hard copy of the movies; I could watch them any time
I wanted. Although I may have spent more money for individual movies as compared to a
Netflix subscription, I was not subject to films of my generation alone. By watching them
multiple times, I was able to critique them as objects as I entered the temporality of the movies
on my own terms.
The advent of mechanical reproduction changed the way we understand the relationship
between space and time. As Farman attests, all narratives exist in spaces. New spaces of media
have allowed people to control when they want to watch films. But these mobile media devices
are still used within the structures designed by the creators. Tarleton Gillespie speaks to the
metaphors and design structures that enforce certain horizons of thinking. He quotes Phil Agre
who says that media systems may “elevate some central category as a ‘normal’ case, so that
integrity of the system depends on its success in hiding or explaining away the associated
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marginal category.”128 In any particular system, marginal associations are limited, so the
potential for associations in the past are even more threatened. On a very basic level, the main
limit of these platforms is less access to past films. We can watch Netflix wherever we want, but
we can only watch what Netflix is allowed to include by production companies. Although there
are other platforms for grassroots content, Netflix deals almost exclusively with major television
corporations and Hollywood. But the streaming of these movies replaces the need for owning a
hard copy. As Wheeler Winston Dixon explains, “Netflix is so anxious to be rid of DVDs that
once a title enters the streaming universe, the physical DVD is summarily dropped from its
inventory . . . the content factor has become almost incidental. If it can be streamed, Netflix
wants it; if not, it doesn’t.”129 For people who have associations with past films, they sacrifice
past content for the illusion of control in the present. Yes, I decide when I want to watch a show,
but when the shows are released and which shows I can watch are up to the Hollywood
executives and Netflix producers.
Because the quality is better on Netflix and the prices are cheap, many people use it. As
early as 2011, Netflix streaming accounted for 22 percent of all internet traffic on average.130
Because of the ability to control when to watch, Netflix has opened a window to a new way of
watching in the form of binge-watching. Binge-watching is when someone watches many
episodes of a show in a row, totaling as many hours as a movie if not more. As noted above, the
cinematic experience is different from other media interactions, but binge-watching creates an
immersion and synchronized consciousness into the film similar to the cinema. Stiegler identifies
the cinema as the source for fighting the control over consciousness, but Netflix binge-watching

128

Gillepsie, 116.
Winston Wheeler Dixon, Streaming: Movies, Media, and Instant Access, (University Press of Kentucky, 2013)
109.
130
Wheeler Winston Dixon, 143.
129

62

may also have the potential to create singularity with certain shows or films. But in comparison
to the “we” provided in the theater, Netflix may be watched alone, secluded, and in no way
connected to anyone. This flips the coin on its head. Because of limited access and a quick
turnover of films, the control over what to watch creates a synchronization of consciousness
similar to television or other consumer based media.
It goes without saying that binge-watching may come from a desire to immerse oneself
into another world, but some shows are notoriously interactive and therefore more immersive.
Again, this is a two-sided coin that may create an adoption (leading to singularity) or an
individual experience that is subject to manipulation (non-social and consumerist). One
particular show uses a device that makes the characters feel parallel to the watch time of the
society: The Office. This show, adapted from a British version and originally airing on NBC but
now exclusively on Netflix, is about a group of workers at a fictional paper company. In the
fictional world of the show, the company is being filmed for a documentary. In a revolutionary
breaking of the fourth wall, the characters look directly at the camera because they are talking to
the “documentary crew,” but to the viewers, the characters are talking directly to them. Bolter
and Grusin may explain this as a “naïve” type of viewing.131 Viewers know that the characters
are not speaking to them, yet in the moment of viewing, there is a belief or “marvel” hold on
them. This technique creates a cast of relatable characters and easier interpellation of the film.
Because the characters seem to be interacting with the audience, the divide between the
temporality of the film and that of the objective temporality is blurred.
Because the show is a documentary that the characters eventually get to watch, the show
also mentions the idea of being filmed in everyday life and the effect it may have on memory. At
the end of the ninth and final season, the characters are shown watching the documentary. Like
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in Blade Runner 2049, old scenes are reused in the show that the viewers must reconfigure in
their memory. This creates a layering of the show on top of itself. In a show about regular work
people, The Office recordings look similar to personal recordings that any regular person may
make. In the finale, Jim, who falls in love with and marries another worker Pam, explains the
significance of the documentary to him, “Imagine going back and watching a tape of your life;
you could see yourself change and make mistakes and grow up. You could watch yourself fall in
love, watch yourself become a husband, become a father. You guys gave that to me, and that’s
an amazing gift.”132 Jim’s speech implies that seeing our past through film is objectively positive
and that layering old memories onto new ones does not take away from the memory of the time
we have in our imagination. In actuality, remembering through tertiary temporalities allows for
the lived memory to be warped and changed. As a viewer, we are also reminded of these scenes
that we “lived” with Jim as we adopted the temporality of the show. The show erases its own
potential for singularity by reusing old scenes in new episodes.
The Personal Video
The recording of life can be done by anyone with access to a mobile video camera. This
started with the invention of the home video. The home video complicates the relationship of
film and identity with a particular type of tertiary memory. In the 21st century, many people will
have videos of when they were younger. When we re-watch these videos, we re-contextualize
ourselves in relation to the present context. As I watch the movie, I see a version of myself that I
must share temporality with in my moment of viewing, despite the fact that I have already lived
that moment in a different temporality that also exists in my imagination.
For example, when I was 20 years old, I watched a home video of me as a 10-year-old. In
the video, I am in my childhood living room with my younger brothers. My parents direct and
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ask us questions. While we play in the living room, a second home video plays through the VCR
on the television. In the second video, I am five. In the first home video, my brother and I imitate
the younger versions of ourselves. As I watch at 20 years old, I am aware of my body existing in
that moment in three different times. As I think about the video now, I exist in four moments
simultaneously: the 25 year old me now, and my respective 20, 10, and 5 year old selves. But I
do not remember the 20 year old watching experience. I cannot remember who was in the room
or what day I watched it, but I remember the video of myself watching myself. All three
memories have been flattened into one moment. Importantly, the moment not on video is
forgotten. This is a unique example of tertiary memory that has changed my own memory. While
I am still able to make associations of that time period that are not on the film, the actual
moments of film are replaced in my imagination: the aesthetic has lost its singularity. Clearly the
videos of my past life have overpowered the ability for other memories to associate with certain
times in my life. Seeing old films in new contexts has implications on how I remember. My past,
in a sense, has been quantified and qualified into these units of video tape recordings.
The home videos of my younger selves are different than a photo album. A photo album
clearly separates certain moments. Even a collection of videos together can be separated, but the
use of video within another video makes the original video impossible to remember the same
way ever again. They are indelibly linked into a new narrative. This is the worst possibility of
Virilio’s “now time.” Not only can art be layered onto the current moment, but the existence of a
past as one existing only in our imagination or secondary retention is put into question.
Personally, seeing my former self was grotesque. The grotesque affect also works to erase my
lived memory. I did not want to imagine that I acted in that way at some point, even in moments
that would be objectively okay to anyone other than me. Other people may never experience this
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type of tertiary memory of the home video, but the possibility may become more prevalent in the
future.
Augmented Reality and the Blade Runner “Future”
I want to make sure to reiterate that in my opinion there is nothing inherently daunting
about the technologies of new media. Jenkins explains the black box of media as a fallacy
because all new technologies exist within certain eras and cultures.133 I am not concerned with
the threat to human communication. Neither do I think that the seemingly unlimited “database”
is overwhelming. As Farman explains, the database only exists in theory because every
interaction we have with mobile media requires direct activity.134 Every use of mobile media is
also a temporal interaction and one that could fit into a narrative structure. Because every lived
moment exists temporally, Farman analyzes how different spaces construct interactions and
ultimately identity. He is critical of those who say that new media makes people more
disconnected. Every generation had similar fears about new technology, and yet each generation
continues to interact and enjoy each other, although often within spaces that “intermix the virtual
and material.”135 However, it is important to focus on the new spaces where we interact because
of Hollywood’s constant threat to memory.
Media technology evolves quickly, and new technologies have changed the way we use
digital tools. This is an ongoing relationship between the imagination of writers and the creators
of technology. Many inventions that have been on screen are being slowly pushed onto the
market. One of these is augmented reality. Augmented reality is a temporal experience that may
involve all facets of the senses, which opens up the potential for participation. But it also may
never show the same moment twice, causing a perpetual desire for new material. The less
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participation we have and the more saturated our temporalities are with Hollywood media, the
less possibility for forming SAMs. Therefore, there has to be a balance between the two.
Otherwise, people do not participate in the formation of their ideologies and experiences. We
become swept away by fantasy worlds without acknowledging the need for material and sensual
development.
One character in the Blade Runner 2049 film, Joi, is an interesting mix of an artificially
intelligent augmented character. She is a virtual program created by Wallace to service the needs
of people for companionship. At the beginning of the film, Kay’s version of Joi is bound to
Kay’s house by his current technology, but, when Kay must leave his home for good, she enters
into an “eminator.” Although she has freedom to roam freely, her being exists in a thin desk that
Kay keeps in his pocket. This allows her to move about freely and create her own experiences.
On the one hand, the film shows the possibilities to create memories through augmented reality.
Although Joi is programmed to serve Kay’s every need, Kay and Joi create a believable
relationship that evolves according to their experiences together. This follows with Jason Kalin’s
work on augmented reality who says that augmented reality would create a return to the physical
spaces of the world. No longer bound to the box of a phone, augmented reality can exist within
other spaces of the world and increase people’s sensory participation.
Eventually, Joi’s disk is destroyed and consequently her being. Towards the end of the
film, Kay is standing on a dark bridge with a giant blue version of a recorded Joi talking to him.
Kay does not say anything, so his feelings about seeing Joi are left up to the audience, but it can
be deduced that he questions the memories he has of her. In comparing his own life to that of
Deckard’s, he sees his own memories as worth less than Deckard’s daughter’s memories. In this
moment, he decides to go find and free Deckard from Wallace, regardless of his personal
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sacrifice. Even though he had an authentic experience with Joi, he knows that his interactions
with her were programmed, repeatable, and therefore not singular. Despite the social component
of their interactions, the fact that Joi was programmed left Kay unsatisfied.
This inclusion of the social component segues into another concern for augmented
reality: the control of movement. Movement creates affects. In the same way that embodying
media can create certain conscious synchronization, augmented reality may be able to establish
and limit movement. For example, I frequently dance when I listen to songs, whether it is in the
car or in public (I sing in my head, so it can really be anywhere). I am always surprised that my
movements seem to evolve in relation to videos I have recently watched. If I were to experience
these videos in an augmented reality experience, I could willingly copy these movements despite
their limitations. Dance, or movement more generally, is one of the best ways of recalling
memories. Nathan To argues that “movement can transcend the limits of verbal and written
engagements of haunted histories.”136 We must acknowledge other ways of producing visual art
that extend beyond language. Especially in regards to lost memory, the ability to move can create
affectual triggers that jostle and reveal old histories. Therefore, any limitation on this movement
through the use of augmented reality can be harmful in the long term.
Stiegler believes that symbolic misery comes from “a loss in individuation which results
from the loss of participation in the production of symbols.”137 The irony (which also implies the
reality) is that there is a loss of participation at the same time that there are more opportunities to
create symbols with new media. Although it may seem like there is participation, the divide
between the rich and poor has only grown as capitalism continues to extend to new markets.
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These two ideas are related more intimately than ever. Therefore the questions remain, will we
be swept away, unwilling to use our senses to participate in production? Can we learn to see
ourselves as more than receptive beings and as participators? As I stated at the end of Part 1, this
does not mean that people must paint on a canvas or remix a video to participate. The difference
has to do with what spaces we decide to experience affect and how we spend our days
embodying media. We can involve ourselves in as many virtual experiences as possible so long
as we acknowledge our own diversified identities that can be created as we exist in this media
saturated, market-driven environments.
Conclusion
Throughout this paper, I have not discussed any specific themes or ideologies promoted
in Blade Runner 2049. Perhaps surprisingly for a sci-fi, I probably could write an in-depth
analysis of gender, class, or the environment, all of which are important in the film. Set in the
future, the world in the film has an enormous divide between classes, has particular gender
implications, as well as many other themes. Although I do not analyze them in this paper
specifically, they are imbedded in the argument. Without specific and diversified singularities,
we lose the ability to critique any issues relating to class, gender, and race. We become swept
away by the grand narratives and rewriting of history that happens as the “old” is repurposed
onto the “new.”
At the very least, I believe memories are important and that Hollywood seeks to control
affectual responses, control the possibilities for choices and identities, sell products within these
narrow desires, and make profit. One way to counter this development is to make other
representations of films, but not everyone must have artistic skills to have singularities. These
may be unrealistic goals, and they will not stop institutions from making cinema and controlling
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media. However, the tools that people do have are their valuable and different experiences, their
different grammars; people have lived in different generations. These unique perspectives can be
displayed through media devices, artistic skill, language, or in a form of an indescribable
affectual and body-centered event.138 Regardless of the tool, the goal is to understand and
attempt to form staple associative memories. For poststructuralists, this may be similar to the
idea of citing. Greg Ulmer created what he calls the “Konsult,” a technological space where the
combination of experiences and citations can create better collection of memory and community
during a time of crisis.139 But, we must also cite in our daily lives. This is done by sharing and
talking to other people about art and engaging in the process of decoding film. I ask readers to
filter through the mass and find narratives, analyze them, talk to friends about them,
recontextualize them with art if you are so called. Watch movies a thousand times.
I ask this fully aware that many people will not want to participate. Lanham describes the
nature of the Western man as one of oscillation between the rhetorical and the serious. Mobile
media allows for the pleasure of the rhetorical in more contexts, and very little is stopping this
desire. But there is also the possibility of the grotesque, which is an affect that in part drives my
research. I feel a grotesque feeling when I see my younger selves in a home video or when I
learn a song has been sampled. The grotesque self that I saw in the previous versions of myself
gives me power in the present. If time does not exist, then I have no reason to rush to work, or to
buy the new thing. The obsession with the watch time has led to an intense desire to live longer
and longer. Medicines, scientific discoveries, and pragmatism all work under the assumption that
more time alive means a better life. But without a past, our futures are not our own to live.
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At the climax of Blade Runner 2049, Harrison Ford playing the role of Deckard sits
trapped in a spinner (flying car) on the concrete bank of the Pacific Ocean. Outside among the
rising tides, Kay and Wallace’s henchwoman, Luv, fight for the right to control Deckard’s future.
Kay wants to connect him with his daughter while Luv wants to use him to create slaves. As
Harrison sits helplessly waiting while new models of people fight around him, I cannot help but
relate his situation to that of the present day viewer. Ford’s position looks bleak, both as a
character and as an actor, as the character he played in 1982 is reprised and warped into the
future. Not only is the real actor aging, but his original creation in Blade Runner fades along with
him. And with it, fades the memories of those who watched the original film; their past re-taken
by Hollywood’s visual effects and streaming world. The leader of the original rogue replicants
Roy Batty said it best. As he dies on a rooftop sitting across from Deckard, he contemplates the
memories he has gained in his short time on earth, “all those moments will be lost, like tears in
rain.”
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